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Abstract—[Context] Defect Causal Analysis (DCA) represents 
an efficient practice to improve software processes. While 
knowledge on cause-effect relations is helpful to support DCA, 
collecting cause-effect data may require significant effort and 
time. [Goal] We propose and evaluate a new DCA approach 
that uses cross-company data to support the practical 
application of DCA. [Method] We collected cross-company 
data on causes of requirements engineering problems from 74 
Brazilian organizations and built a Bayesian network. Our 
DCA approach uses the diagnostic inference of the Bayesian 
network to support DCA sessions. We evaluated our approach 
by applying a model for technology transfer to industry and 
conducted three consecutive evaluations: (i) in academia, (ii) 
with industry representatives of the Fraunhofer Project Center 
at UFBA, and (iii) in an industrial case study at the Brazilian 
National Development Bank (BNDES). [Results] We received 
positive feedback in all three evaluations and the cross-
company data was considered helpful for determining main 
causes. [Conclusions] Our results strengthen our confidence in 
that supporting DCA with cross-company data is promising 
and should be further investigated. 
Keywords-defect causal analysis; cross-company data; 
Bayesian network; case study; technology transfer; requirements 
engineering 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Defect causal analysis (DCA) [1] encompasses the 
identification of causes of defects and ways to prevent them 
from recurring in the future. Effective DCA has helped to 
reduce defect rates by about 50% in organizations such as 
IBM [2], Computer Science Corporation [3], and InfoSys 
[4]. Reducing defect rates also reduces rework and the total 
project effort, improving productivity [5]. 
Given these benefits, to provide guidance on how to 
implement DCA in software organizations, we conducted a 
Systematic Literature Review (SLR) in 2006 and replicated 
in 2007, 2009, and 2010 [5]. The results allowed producing 
evidence-based guidelines on how to implement DCA and 
the identification of investigation opportunities. For instance, 
we found that “the DCA state of the art did not include any 
approach integrating learning mechanisms regarding cause-
effect relations into DCA meetings”. 
This result encouraged us to initiate research to propose a 
DCA approach integrating cause-effect learning mechanisms 
into DCA meetings. An initial concept [6] suggests 
aggregating knowledge gathered in successive within-
company causal analysis events to assemble a deeper 
understanding of the defects’ cause-effect relations by using 
Bayesian networks. It is noteworthy that Bayesian networks 
have been used in other contexts in the software engineering 
domain such as defect prediction [7] and decision making 
[8]. In the DCA context, their use aims at creating and 
maintaining common causal models to support defect cause 
identification in each DCA event [6]. The diagnostic 
inference of those causal models can then be used to answer 
questions during DCA meetings, such as: “Within my 
organizational context, what are the causes that commonly 
lead to a specific defect type?”. 
Later, this initial concept was evolved and tailored into 
the DPPI (Defect Prevention-Based Process Improvement) 
approach [9]. The experience of applying DPPI retroactively 
to a real software project indicated its usage feasibility [9]. 
Moreover, according to the participants, DPPI's Bayesian 
diagnostic inference predicted the main defect causes 
efficiently, motivating further investigation. This lead to an 
experimental study and the preliminary results indicated 
benefits of using the diagnostic inferences during DCA 
sessions regarding effectiveness and effort [10]. 
The positive results encouraged us to institutionalize the 
DPPI process in a small-sized software organization (~25 
employees) [11]. There, the approach was applied to analyze 
defects of requirements and designs, allowing further 
comprehension on its industry readiness and objectively 
measuring effort and obtained benefits. The average 
application effort was reasonably low (15.5 hours) when 
compared to the obtained benefits (reducing defect rates by 
46 percent for requirements and 50 percent for designs). 
While the defect rate results were similar to those mentioned 
in literature (e.g., [2][3][4][5]), the contribution of the 
Bayesian diagnostic inference to the DCA sessions was 
hindered by the absence of a great amount of within-
company data on the defects’ cause-effect relations. 
More recently, we started investigating cross-company 
cause-effect relations for critical Requirements Engineering 
(RE) problems based on data from the NaPiRE (Naming the 
Pain in Requirements Engineering) project [12][13]. The 
NaPiRE project comprises the design of a globally 
distributed family of surveys to lay an empirical foundation 
on RE practice and problems [14]. The NaPiRE data 
provided us the opportunity to build a cross-company cause-
effect model for practically relevant RE problems.  
In this paper, we hypothesize that such cross-company 
cause-effect model could be useful to support DCA sessions 
in specific industrial contexts and empirically investigate this 
issue. Using cross-company data to support DCA sessions 
has not been considered so far. Our investigation followed 
the model for technology transfer suggested by Gorschek et 
al. [16]. This model consists of conducting consecutive 
evaluations in different contexts: (i) in academia, (ii) with 
industry representatives (static validation), and (iii) in a real 
industrial context (dynamic validation). The academic 
evaluation was conducted in a graduate course on software 
engineering. The evaluation with industry representatives 
was conducted with employees of the Fraunhofer Project 
Center at UFBA. Finally, we used our approach in an 
industrial case study conducted at the Brazilian National 
Development Bank. Results of all three evaluations indicate 
that the approach was well accepted. Moreover, the cross-
company data was unanimously considered helpful for 
determining main causes during DCA.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section II presents the background on DCA and on the 
NaPiRE project. Section III describes how the cross-
company cause-effect model was built. Section IV 
introduces the cross-company data supported DCA approach. 
Section V presents our industrial evaluation strategy. Section 
VI and VII describe the initial evaluations in academia and 
with industry representatives. Section VIII reports the 
industrial case study. Section IX discusses threats to validity 
before concluding our paper in Section X. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Defect Causal Analysis (DCA) 
Card [17] summarizes the DCA process in six steps: (i) 
to select a sample of the defects; (ii) to classify selected 
defects; (iii) to identify systematic errors; (iv) to determine 
the main causes; (v) to develop action proposals; and (vi) to 
document meeting results. In this context, a systematic error 
is an error that results in the same or similar defects being 
repeated on different occasions. Finding systematic errors 
indicates the existence of improvement opportunities. 
Besides listing these six steps, he highlights the importance 
of managing the implementation of the action proposals until 
their conclusion and communicating the implemented 
changes to the development team. 
A representation of the traditional software defect 
prevention process [18], consistent with the DCA process 
described above, is shown in Fig. 1. DCA can be considered 
part of defect prevention, which also addresses implementing 
improvement actions to prevent the causes (action team 
activity) and communicating changes to the development 
team (stage kickoff activity). The depicted experience base 
indicates defect prevention as a means for communicating 
lessons learned among projects. 
 
Figure 1. Defect Prevention Process. Adapted from [19]. 
Evidence-based guidelines for conducting DCA have 
been provided based on results of an SLR [5]. The guidelines 
provide advice on the techniques that can be used (e.g., 
Pareto charts for identifying categories to search for 
systematic errors or cause-effect diagrams for determining 
main causes for systematic errors), data to be collected, 
defect taxonomies, and cause categories. Also, general DCA 
assumptions and expectations (e.g., costs between 0.5 and 
1.5 of the project budget and defect rate reductions of about 
50%) are described.  
B. The NaPiRE Project 
The NaPiRE project comprises a globally distributed 
family of surveys to lay an empirical foundation on RE 
practice and problems [15]. The design of the survey 
instruments is aligned to a well-defined theory and has been 
extensively reviewed by over 40 researchers world-wide 
[14]. Further information on the project, including a sample 
of the questionnaire and the countries in which the survey is 
being replicated can be found online1. Concerning its results, 
four publications have specifically focused on causes of RE 
problems [12][13][15][19].  
In [12], we presented the aggregated data on common 
causes for critical RE problems, based on answers from 74 
Brazilian organizations. In [19], we focused on addressing 
the causes of the specific problem incomplete/hidden 
requirements, aiming at providing suggestions for its 
prevention based on data from Austria and Brazil. A 
comparison between RE practices, main problems and 
causes in Brazil and Germany can be found in [15]. Finally, 
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in [11], we conducted a cause-effect investigation for critical 
RE problems based on data from the whole dataset [13]. 
The cross-company cause-effect model for RE problems 
built for this research is based on answers from the 74 
Brazilian organizations (each one providing recurring causes 
for up to five RE problems they considered critical in their 
context). These 74 organizations include small, medium and 
large-sized organizations enrolled in both plan-driven and 
agile development. Further details on the Brazilian NaPiRE 
dataset can be found in [12]. 
Table I shows the five most critical RE problems, as 
ranked by the 74 organizations. Those were the only 
problems cited by more than 25% of the respondents. The 
table also shows how often each problem was ranked as the 
most critical. We observed that communication problems 
were often cited (problems #1 and #4), as well as incomplete 
and underspecified requirements (problems #2 and #3). 
TABLE I.  MOST CRITICAL RE PROBLEMS 
# RE Problems Cited Rank #1
1 Communication flaws between the proj. team and the customer 32 (43%) 9 (12%) 
2 Incomplete and/or hidden requirements 31 (42%) 12 (16%)
3 Underspecified requirements (too abstract)  31 (42%) 3 (4%)
4 Communication flaws within the proj. team 26 (35%) 5 (7%)
5 Insufficient support by customer 21 (28%) 5 (7%)
III. CROSS-COMPANY CAUSE-EFFECT MODEL FOR         
RE PROBLEMS 
This section explains how the cross-company model on 
cause-effect relations was built. First, we prepared the 
NaPiRE data provided by the 74 Brazilian organizations and 
then built the cross-company cause-effect model as a 
Bayesian network based on that data using the Netica2 tool.  
We decided to concentrate on the five most cited 
problems shown in Table I. Those problems were cited 
(overall) 141 times. For each of these citations, the 
respondents indicated the main causes and effects in free text 
format. We analyzed and coded the textual data using the 
constant comparative method [20] and peer reviewed the 
codes. As a result, we created 49 cause and 41 effect codes. 
Thereafter, we organized the information in a spreadsheet 
with 105 columns (5 for the problems, 49 for the cause 
codes, 5 for the cause categories, 41 for the effects, and 5 for 
effect categories) and 141 lines (one for each time a problem 
was cited by one of the subjects). Finally, for each line we 
marked the cited problem, its causes, cause categories, 
effects and effect categories. This was the data used for 
building the Bayesian network. 
A Bayesian network consists of two related components: 
a qualitative one, which are the nodes representing random 
variables and the edges representing a direct relationship 
between two random variables (a direct acyclic graph - 
DAG); and a quantitative component, which are the 
conditional probabilistic distributions (CPDs) [21]. While an 
expert of the domain is able to specify the DAG, the same 
cannot be easily done with the CPDs. 
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We built the DAG in Netica by automatically adding 
random variables for each spreadsheet column and then 
manually connecting the variables with arrows indicating the 
causal relations between them. Thereafter, we used Netica to 
learn the CPDs from the spreadsheet data with the 
Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm [22], which is 
indicated when the dataset includes empty values (as ours, 
given that some participants might not have indicated any 
causes) to approximate the CPDs to the real distribution. 
The structure of the resulting Bayesian network DAG is 
shown in Fig. 2. The five cause categories grouping the 
causes were the ones suggested by the guidelines [5] (input, 
method, organization, people, and tools). For the effects, we 
defined categories that allowed us to consistently group the 
effects (customer, design or implementation, product, project 
or organization, and verification or validation). 
Having built the Bayesian network, Netica allows 
conducting diagnostic and predictive inferences. In this 
paper, we focus on diagnostic inferences from problems to 
causes. The dynamics of this usage within our DCA 
approach will be detailed in the next section. 
 
Figure 2. Structure of the Bayesian network DAG. 
IV. CROSS-COMPANY DATA SUPPORTED DCA 
This section describes the proposed DCA approach, 
supported by the cross-company model on cause-effect 
relations of RE problems. In summary, the approach consists 
of performing the DCA steps detailed by Card [17], 
following the DCA guidelines [5] and supporting one of the 
steps, the determination of the main causes, with the cross-
company model. Further details on how to perform each of 
the steps follow: 
• Select a sample of the defects. The sample is 
represented by the defects found during the last 
inspection. We suggest using all the defects as the 
sample and filtering them by the main categories as 
part of the next step. However, in case of many 
defects a U-chart can be used to allow identifying 
data that deserves special attention [5]. 
• Classify selected defects. Following the guidelines, 
the nature of the defects [23] (ambiguity, extraneous 
information, inconsistent information, incorrect fact, 
and omission) is used as classification scheme. A 
Pareto chart is then applied to identify the most 
representative categories of defects, in which the 
identification of systematic errors takes place. 
• Identify systematic errors. This step involves reading 
the defects of the most representative categories 
looking for similar defects being repeated in 
different occasions and the systematic errors leading 
to them. 
• Determine the main causes. This step represents the 
core of DCA. The systematic errors are analyzed 
(ideally with representatives of the document 
authors, inspectors, and process group members [5]) 
seeking for causes that explain why they are 
happening. According to the guidelines, causes 
belong to one of the following categories: input, 
method, organization, people, and tools. This step is 
where we innovate by supporting the determination 
of the main causes with diagnostic inferences of a 
cross-company cause-effect model. These diagnostic 
inferences indicate causes that commonly lead to 
certain defect types and which could be considered 
as a starting point when brainstorming causes.  
• Develop action proposals. Based on the causes, 
actions are proposed to help preventing the 
systematic error to reoccur in the future. 
• Document the meeting results. This step assures that 
the results (e.g., causes and actions) are registered. 
To illustrate the dynamics of using the network’s 
diagnostic inference to support DCA, we use a simple 
example. Suppose that an organization has found several 
defects of type omission and that the systematic error is 
omitting details of business rules that are complex to 
understand. This systematic error regards the problem 
incomplete/hidden requirements. Therefore, before starting 
to discuss the causes from scratch, the DCA team could look 
at the Bayesian diagnostic inference. 
This can be easily done with Netica by clicking on the 
selected problem. Given the size of the Bayesian network, 
we show excerpts of it that are relevant for the example. The 
diagnostic inference of this initial step is shown in Fig. 3. 
Based on the Bayesian probabilities it is possible to observe 
that the causes for this problem usually fall into categories 
people (70%), input (40%), or method (30%).  
 
Figure 3. Diagnostic inference for causes after selecting problem 
incomplete/hidden requirements. 
As a next step, the causes within these categories could be 
analyzed. Again, the diagnostic inference could be used for 
selecting a category and looking at the causes that usually 
happen within it leading to the problem being analyzed. This 
step is shown in Fig. 4 for the people category. It is possible 
to observe that the highest probabilities are given for causes 
“missing qualification of RE team members” (59%), 
“missing domain knowledge” (20%), and “lack of 
experience of RE team members” (10%).  
 
 Figure 4. Diagnostic inference for causes in the people category leading to 
problem incomplete/hidden requirements. 
 
Figure 5. Diagnostic inference with additional expert knowledge indicating 
that two of the causes did not occur. 
These and other causes could then be discussed and the 
Bayesian network’s inference could be tailored based on this 
discussion. For instance, if the session participants know that 
the RE team members are highly qualified and experienced 
this could be informed to the network and the inference 
probabilities would be recalculated considering this 
knowledge. The update for this scenario is shown in Fig. 5. It 
can be seen that considering this expert knowledge the 
highest probabilities are now related to “missing domain 
knowledge” (46%) and “communication is difficult due to 
different languages” (23%).  
It is noteworthy that the discussion should not be limited 
to one category, but focus on the identification of the main 
causes, which may come from different categories. For 
instance, for that same example, the second most likely 
category was input, in which the cause “missing engagement 
from customer side” appeared with the highest diagnostic 
probability (42%). 
At the end of each session, the Bayesian network can be 
updated with within-company data by adding new lines at 
the end of the spreadsheet with the causes identified in the 
within-company DCA sessions and having the Bayesian 
network learning the probabilities again based on the new 
data. Thus, the cross-company data can be used as a start 
learning set that can be continuously improved with within-
company data. 
V. INDUSTRIAL EVALUATION STRATEGY 
Aiming at investigating the feasibility of using our 
approach in industry, we decided to adopt the empirically 
based technology transfer model described by Gorschek et 
al. [16]. This model is shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Figure 6. Technology transfer model suggested by Gorschek et al. [16]. 
Relating our research to the steps depicted in Fig. 6, the 
issue was supporting DCA with cross-company cause-effect 
data. This kind of support has not been considered so far. 
The candidate solution is represented by our approach (cf. 
Section IV). Following the model, three evaluations were 
conducted in different contexts: (i) in academia, (ii) with 
industry representatives (static validation), and (iii) in a real 
industrial case study (dynamic validation). 
We conducted the three evaluations using the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [24], which has been 
extensively used [25]. TAM considers three constructs 
(perceived usefulness, ease of use and self-predicted future 
use), which are measured by a set of questions. We adapted 
our questions from the ones used by Ali Babar et al. [26]. 
The questions are shown in Table II. Additionally, we added 
questions to measure prior experience of subjects and two 
open text questions asking participants if they considered the 
cross-company data helpful for DCA and if they would 
change anything in our approach.  
For the TAM questions we used a seven-point Likert 
scale (1-completely agree, 2-largely agree, 3-partially agree, 
4-neutral, 5-partially disagree, 6-largely disagree, 7-
completely disagree), providing opportunity for optional 
comments on each question.  
TABLE II.  TAM CONSTRUCTS AND QUESTIONS 
# Perceived Usefulness
U1 Using the support in my job, I would be able to accomplish DCA more quickly. (Quick)
U2 Using the support would improve my DCA performance. (Job Performance)
U3 Using the support would increase my DCA productivity. (Increase Productivity)
U4 Using the support would enhance my DCA effectiveness. (Effectiveness) 
U5 Using the support would make DCA easier. (Makes job easier)
U6 I find the support useful to perform DCA. (Useful)
# Ease of Use 
E1 Learning to operate the support would be easy for me. (Easy to 
learn) 
E2 I would find it easy to use the support to do what I want it to do.
(Controllable)
E3 My interaction with the support would be clear and 
understandable. (Clear and understandable) 
E4 It would be easy to become skillful in using the support. (Skillful)
E5 It would be easy to remember how to perform DCA tasks using 
the support. (Remember)
E6 I find the support easy to use. (Easy to use) 
# Self-predicted future use
S1 Assuming the support is available on my job, I predict that I will 
use it on a regular basis in the future.  
S2 I prefer using the support for conducting DCA than not using it.
VI. INITIAL EVALUATION IN ACADEMIA 
The academic evaluation took place in the context of a 
graduate course on software engineering during the second 
semester of 2015 at the University of Salvador (Brazil).  
The study had 15 participants. For simulating the DCA 
sessions, we divided them into three groups and prepared an 
environment for each group, installing Netica and opening 
the created Bayesian network. Before starting the session, 
participants had to vote and agree on three of the five RE 
problems represented in the Bayesian network. Thereafter 
they were asked to discuss the main causes, based on their 
prior experience, using the support of the cross-company 
model and its diagnostic inferences during 30 minutes. 
The experience of the participants in industry, with RE 
and the number of software projects they participated in are 
shown in Table III. Only one of the subjects did not have 
prior experience in industry and only two had no prior 
experience with RE in particular. 
After conducting the cross-company model supported 
DCA session, they were asked to answer the TAM 
questionnaire. It is noteworthy that we could not assess the 
results of the DCA session itself, given that they were based 
on the participants’ experience. Our focus was on the 
acceptance of the technology to support the discussions. The 
results of the TAM questionnaire are shown in Table IV. 
This table shows the frequency count for each of the seven-
point Likert scale judgements, highlighting the mode (most 
frequently chosen judgement). It can be seen that the overall 
results are mainly positive for all three TAM constructs, 
usefulness, ease of use and self-predicted use.  
TABLE III.  EXPERIENCE OF THE ACADEMY PARTICIPANTS. 
# Group Exp. in Industry 
(years) 
Exp. with RE 
(years) 
# Projects
1 A 2 1 1
2 A 0 0 0
3 A 10 0 4
4 A 3 1 2
5 A 6 6 8
6 B 4 1 1
7 B 15 12 15
8 B 5 5 5
9 B 3 3 7
10 B 3 3 4
11 C 7 6 10
12 C 8 8 6
13 C 7 7 10
14 C 5 5 10
15 C 3 0.5 1
TABLE IV.  TAM QUESTION LIKERT SCALE FREQUENCY COUNT. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
U1 7 6 2 0 0 0 0 15
U2 7 2 5 1 0 0 0 15
U3 7 3 3 2 0 0 0 15
U4 8 4 3 0 0 0 0 15
U5 11 4 0 0 0 0 0 15
U6 12 1 2 0 0 0 0 15
E1 3 6 3 1 2 0 0 15
E2 4 9 2 0 0 0 0 15
E3 6 5 3 1 0 0 0 15
E4 8 5 1 1 0 0 0 15
E5 9 5 1 0 0 0 0 15
E6 9 5 1 0 0 0 0 15
S1 9 4 2 0 0 0 0 15
S2 4 6 2 1 1 1 0 15
Although being minority, isolated negative evaluations 
were observed for questions E1 and S2. In question E1, 
concerning learning to operate the support, the grades 5 
provided by participants #2 and #9 came with textual 
justifications that allowed us understanding that there was a 
misinterpretation. Participant #2 mentioned “I would 
probably not be able to build the Bayesian network” and 
participant #9 mentioned “This is the first time I am using 
Netica”. However, our question focused on operating the 
support, not on building it.  
For question S2, concerning the preference of using the 
support, participant #7 and #12 rated it with grades 5 and 6, 
respectively. Their answers to the open text question on if 
they would change anything on the approach provided hints 
to interpret their judgement. Participant #7 argued 
“Although the provided knowledge is excellent in terms of 
content, I believe that the Bayesian network could be more 
clearly presented”. Participant #12 mentioned “I would 
include filtering mechanisms allowing to isolate specific 
causes of the problem and their effects”. Thus, while they 
would use the approach (both answered 1 to question S1), 
they had suggestions on the improvement of the Bayesian 
network presentation to practitioners. 
The usefulness was also highlighted by the participants in 
the open text question on if they considered the cross-
company data helpful. All the participants agreed in their 
answers, except of one who left the question empty. The 
answer of the most experienced participant (#7) reflects the 
general observed opinion of the participants well “The 
provided data is very important, it reflects a large range of 
situations, this facilitates the identification of common 
causes faced on a day by day basis during the professional 
activities. DCA can benefit from a solid knowledge base, 
acquired based on real situations and real problems”.  
VII. EVALUATION WITH INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES 
The evaluation with industry representatives was 
conducted with three professionals of the Fraunhofer Project 
Center (FPC) at UFBA enrolled in a large-scale project, 
called RESCUER (Reliable and Smart Crowdsourcing 
Solution for Emergency and Crisis Management), in which 
high-quality RE plays a crucial role. 
As suggested by Gorschek et al. [17], this follow-up to 
the academic evaluation was an off-line static validation with 
the industry representatives, i.e., we did not use the approach 
within the real project lifecycle to analyze causes of real 
defect data at this point. The main difference from the 
academic evaluation was that the industry representatives 
were active professionals that had a common project context 
to refer to while applying the approach. 
Before starting the session, participants had to decide on 
three of the RE problems represented in the Bayesian 
network that they considered relevant for their context. 
Thereafter, they were asked to discuss the main causes based 
on their current project experience using support of the 
cross-company model during 30 minutes. 
The experience of the participants with RE, the number 
of projects and their experience at the FPC are shown in 
Table V. It can be seen that all three are highly experienced 
with RE. The short time at the FPC reflects that this center 
was recently established in Salvador. 
TABLE V.  EXPERIENCE OF THE FPC INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES. 
# Exp. with RE (years) # Projects Exp. at FPC (years)
1 8 12 1
2 15 10 1
3 10 12 0.25
After conducting the cross-company model supported 
DCA session, they were asked to answer the TAM 
questionnaire. As this was an informal DCA session, 
conducted without real project data, our focus was not on 
the results (identified causes), but on evaluating the 
acceptance of using the approach, now from the perspective 
of industry representatives enrolled in a real project. The 
results of the TAM questionnaire are shown in Table VI. 
The highlighted mode frequencies indicate that the 
industry representatives had a slightly more skeptical view 
than the students on the acceptance of the technology. 
However, overall the evaluation mainly indicates 
usefulness, ease of use and self-predicted future use. The 
only negative answer came from participant #1 on question 
S2. When asked on if he would change anything on the 
approach, he mentioned “identifying the causes is not our 
main problem, but finding solutions to address them”. In 
fact, the identification of the solution option actions is 
currently out of the scope of the cross-company model. 
TABLE VI.  TAM QUESTION LIKERT SCALE FREQUENCY COUNT. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
U1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
U2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
U3 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3
U4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
U5 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
U6 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
E1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
E2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3
E3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
E4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
E5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
E6 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3
S1  2 1 0 0 0 0 3
S2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3
Concerning the open question on if they considered the 
cross-company data helpful for DCA all three participants 
agreed. Participant #1, for instance, mentioned “I agree. 
Mainly because if we wouldn’t have the suggested causes 
we could possibly limit our analysis to the causes that we 
remember, not considering relevant causes that may have 
happened in our context. The data supports the analysis, 
making it quicker and more effective”.  
VIII. INDUSTRIAL CASE STUDY 
The final evaluation, as suggested by the technology 
transfer model [17], was an on-line dynamic validation in an 
industrial case study applying our cross-company data 
supported DCA approach within a real project lifecycle to 
analyze causes of problems related to real defects. The case 
study description is based on available guidelines [27].  
A. Case Study Objective 
The case study investigates the acceptance of using our 
cross-company data supported DCA approach for conducting 
DCA sessions within a real software development project. 
Besides the acceptance, this time we were also interested in 
the results of the DCA session (e.g., identified causes). 
B. Project Context 
The opportunity of conducting the evaluation in a real 
software development project took place at the Brazilian 
National Development Bank (BNDES). BNDES is the main 
financing agent for development in Brazil, financing 
important investments for the country’s growth. 
The goal of the project, called Garantias (Assurances), is 
to develop software to manage information on the assurances 
offered by organizations to BNDES as a counterpart to 
financial support. Assurances refer to debt acquired when 
financial support is approved and aim at providing security 
to the fulfillment of the contractual obligations. Thus, the 
project concerns part of BNDES’s core business. 
The project was divided in two modules, each one 
developed using an incremental and iterative lifecycle. 
Requirements were specified during the elaboration phase in 
the format of use cases. DCA was applied to defects in use 
case descriptions of the second module, which comprised 
three consecutive elaboration iterations (EL1, EL2, and EL3).  
The requirements elicitation was conducted internally at 
BNDES and the specification with use cases and prototypes 
was conducted by employees of a third party company, 
working together with the internal representatives. After the 
specification, reviewers from BNDES performed the 
inspections and registered defects. The size of each of these 
elaboration phases in number of use cases and Function 
Points (FP) is shown in Table VII. This table also shows the 
total inspection effort and the number of defects found. 
TABLE VII.  SIZE OF THE ELABORATION PHASES. 
ID # Use Cases Total FP Inspection 
Effort (hours) 
# Defects Found
EL1 8 69 29 69
EL2 25 292 88 181
EL3 35 416 77 214
The DCA team involved the BNDES Product Owner 
(P.O.), two BNDES reviewers, and three third party 
employees that worked on the use case specifications. The 
experience of the team members is shown in Table VIII. 
TABLE VIII.  EXPERIENCE OF THE DCA PARTICIPANTS. 
# Exp. with 
RE (years) 
# Projects Company Exp. at the 
Company (years) 
1 3 6 BNDES 8
2 2 2 BNDES 7
3 0.75 1 BNDES 0.75
4 10 10 Third Party 3.5
5 8 9 Third Party 2
6 3 3 Third Party 1.5
C. Instrumentation and Procedure 
We were involved in the project during the EL2 
elaboration phase. As a first step, during EL2, we improved 
the inspection process designing a defect-based checklist 
(for defect categories ambiguity, extraneous information, 
inconsistent information, incorrect fact, and omission) and a 
spreadsheet to register the defects and effort according to 
the categories, and introducing inspection validation 
meetings. As we wanted to understand the whole picture, we 
retrospectively classified the defects found during the EL1 
phase and also registered them into the spreadsheet. For 
iterations EL2 and EL3 the spreadsheet was directly used 
during the inspections. At the end of EL3 we had all the 
defect data and found the opportunity of conducting DCA. 
To prepare for the DCA session, we accomplished the 
first three steps of our approach, selecting the sample of the 
defects, classifying selected defects and reading their 
descriptions for identifying systematic errors. Due to space 
constraints, we describe how these steps were conducted for 
the largest iteration, EL3. 
When selecting the sample of defects, we analyzed each 
sample using two U-charts (statistical process control charts 
suggested by the guidelines [5] that show varying control 
limits, considering the size of the sample, to help 
understanding defect metrics, given that defects follow a 
Poisson distribution), one concerning the number of defects 
per FP and the other with the number of defects per 
inspection hour. The charts allowed identifying use cases 
with higher defect rates and comparing the quality of the 
requirements of the different elaboration phases. The U-
chart with the number of defects per FP for each of EL3’s 
35 use cases is shown in Fig. 7. It can be seen that the 
average number of defects per FP was 0.5 and that some use 
cases concentrated more defects. Later, discussions would 
clarify that those were the use cases with the most complex 
business rules. 
 
Figure 7. Defects per FP per use case of iteration EL3. 
As the total number of defects was manageable, we used 
all the defects as sample for each iteration and plotted 
Pareto charts on the defect categories. Concerning, 
classifying the selected defects, the classification into the 
categories was already happening during the inspections in 
which the defects were revealed. The Pareto chart for EL3 
can be seen in Fig. 8. In this iteration, the defects of 
categories omission and incorrect fact (which together 
represented more than 60% of the defects) were selected for 
identifying systematic errors. 
 
Figure 8. Pareto chart on the defects of iteration EL3. 
To identify the systematic errors we read through the 76 
defects of type omission and 46 incorrect facts trying to 
understand what exactly has been omitted or misunderstood. 
Grouping those defects into clusters helped identifying the 
systematic errors for which the causes should be determined 
in the DCA session. The listing of all types of omissions and 
incorrect facts that happened more than 5 times is shown in 
Table IX. The main systematic errors found for each 
iteration and the number of defects produced by the error 
are shown in Table X. 
TABLE IX.  OMISSIONS AND INCORRECT FACTS IN DETAIL. 
Type Detail Count
Omission Business rules 11
Omission Link to business rules 10
Omission Actor 10
Omission Details in the prototype 10
Omission Field of a form 7
Omission Identification of mandatory fields 5
Incorrect Fact Wrong understanding (comm. problem) 19
Incorrect Fact Linking the wrong business rule 6
Incorrect Fact Wrong the wrong use case flow 6
Incorrect Fact Prototype is wrong 5
TABLE X.  MAIN SYSTEMATIC ERRORS. 
Iteration Defect Category Systematic Error (number of defects)
EL1 Ambiguity Underspecifying Reqs. (7)
EL1 Omission Omitting links to between use cases (5)
EL2 Omission Omitting links to Business Rules (21) 
EL2 Omission Omitting details of Business Rules (7)
EL2 Inc. Fact Linking Business Rules incorrectly (7)
EL3 Omission Omitting details of Business Rules (11)
EL3 Omission Omitting links to Business Rules (10)
EL3 Inc. Fact Incorrect facts due to comm. prob. (19)
EL3 Inc. Fact Linking Business Rules incorrectly (6)
For determining the main causes, the systematic errors 
were taken to the DCA meeting together with the samples of 
defects related to them. In the meeting, they were discussed 
between the first two authors and the six DCA participants. 
Those discussions were supported by the defect descriptions 
and the diagnostic inferences of the Bayesian cross-
company cause-effect model. During this process, we 
referred to diagnostic inferences for common causes of three 
RE problems: incomplete/hidden requirements, 
underspecified requirements and communication problems. 
After determining the main causes of the systematic 
errors, the final steps of the approach were accomplished by 
developing action proposals and documenting the meeting 
results. 
D. Results 
The participants were confident in having determined 
the main causes for the systematic errors. The main causes 
are shown in Table XI. The causes included in the cross-
company cause-effect model are highlighted in bold. 
Some causes appearing for systematic errors of all 
iterations could be associated to the fact that this was the first 
DCA meeting. Some causes, however, were informally 
addressed over time (mainly based on the inherent learning 
involved when conducting inspections), resulting in 
improvements throughout the iterations. In fact, the defect 
rates reduced from 1 defect per FP in EL1 to 0.6 defects per 
FP in EL2 and 0.5 defects per FP in EL3 (reduction of 50%). 
The efficiency of the inspections remained almost stable, 
with a slight improvement from finding 2.4 defects per hour 
in EL1, 2.1 in EL2 and 2.8 in EL3. 
It is noteworthy that the skills of the RE team members 
seem to have improved during the iterations, resulting in a 
reduction on ambiguities (which were the main defect 
category only in EL1). Also, while peer reviews were 
already used in EL1, in EL2 and EL3 inspection meetings 
were introduced. Finally, during the discussions, it was 
mentioned that EL2 and EL3 had inherently more complex 
use cases when compared to EL1, which explains why 
incorrect fact was a relevant category for those iterations. It 
was also mentioned that during EL3 changes of 
requirements were more frequent. 
TABLE XI.  MAIN CAUSES OF THE SYSTEMATIC ERRORS. 
Systematic Error  Main Causes 
Underspecifying 
Requirements 
• Absence if inspection (validation) meetings 
during EL1 
• Lack of experience of RE team members 
• Lack of time 
Omitting links to 
between use cases 
• Absence if inspection (validation) meetings 
during EL1 
• Lack of experience of RE team members 
• Oversight 
Omitting links to 
Business Rules  
• Business rules created for the first module 
by other team members 
• Huge amount of Business Rules 
• Lack of domain knowledge 
Omitting details of 
Business Rules 
• Complexity of the domain 
• Lack of domain knowledge 
• Missing completeness check 
Linking Business 
Rules incorrectly 
• Business rules created for the first module 
by other team members 
• Huge amount of Business Rules 
• Oversight 
Incorrect facts due to 
comm. problems 
• Changes in the team between iterations 
• Changes in requirements in EL3 
• Complexity of the domain 
• Lack of domain knowledge 
The action proposals suggested for addressing the causes 
were: (i) having the P.O. providing additional training on 
the business domain, (ii) providing an overview presentation 
on the already documented business rules to make RE team 
members aware of them, (iii) publishing the most frequent 
systematic errors and examples of related defects, and (iv) 
improving the inspection checklist to assure that defects 
associated to systematic errors are captured.  
Since EL3 was the last iteration of the project, the 
effectiveness of these actions cannot be directly measured. 
However, as mentioned by one of the participants (#2) “the 
identified causes and action proposals will help us to take 
the improvements achieved throughout the iterations of the 
Garantias project to an organizational level”. 
The answers of the participants to the TAM questions is 
shown in Table XII. This table shows an overall scenario of 
acceptance regarding usefulness, ease of use and self-
predicted future use. The only slightly negative answer was 
provided by participant #6 concerning question S2, 
indicating that he would probably not prefer using the 
support, contrasting the opinion of the other participants. 
Unfortunately, no further explanations were provided. 
As in the other two studies, in the open question 
concerning if the cross-company data was helpful all 
participants agreed, despite of one who did not answer the 
question. Participant #2 mentioned “Yes, I believe that the 
causes are common and the statistics help a lot in the 
analysis”, referring to the diagnostic probabilities of the 
Bayesian network. Participant #4 also elaborated on the 
answer “Yes, the comparison during the discussions 
facilitates identifying the causes”. We are currently refining 
the DCA approach description to make it available to them 
together with the Bayesian network support. 
TABLE XII.  TAM QUESTION LIKERT SCALE FREQUENCY COUNT. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
U1 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 6
U2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 6
U3 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 6
U4 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 6
U5 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 6
U6 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 6
E1 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
E2 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 6
E3 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 6
E4 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 6
E5 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 6
E6 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 6
S1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 6
S2 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 6
IX.  THREATS TO VALIDITY 
Concerning the threat categories described by Runeson 
et al. [27], external validity was enhanced by using carefully 
analyzed NaPiRE data for building the cross-company 
model and by following the model for technology transfer 
[16], which involved conducting studies in academy, with 
industry representatives and in a real industrial case study. It 
is noteworthy that the cross-company data was judged 
helpful by all participants. 
Concerning construct validity, we evaluated acceptance 
by using the TAM model, which has been widely used for 
this purpose [25]. Moreover, we triangulated the perception 
of the TAM questionnaire with open questions for further 
and comparative qualitative analyses.  
To mitigate threats to internal validity, we conducted the 
studies with direct supervision of the researchers to allow 
observing any potential confounding factors. Finally, 
reliability of the last study may be slightly compromised 
given that two researchers participated in the DCA session. 
However, this was needed since it was a real industry 
partner and participants were not experienced in conducting 
DCA. We encourage other researchers to replicate the study 
with their industry partners. 
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This research represents the first investigation on using 
cross-company data to support DCA. To this end, we 
defined an approach that uses diagnostic inferences of a 
Bayesian network, built based on cross-company data, 
during DCA.  
To evaluate our approach, we applied the model for 
technology transfer suggested by Gorschek et al. [16]. We 
conducted three consecutive evaluations in different 
contexts: (i) in academia, (ii) with industry representatives 
enrolled in a real software development project at the 
Fraunhofer Project Center at UFBA, and (iii) in an industrial 
case study at the Brazilian National Development Bank 
were real defect data was collected and analyzed. 
The results on the acceptance of the technology were 
very positive and the cross-company data was unanimously 
considered helpful for determining main causes by the 
participants of all three evaluations. Therefore, the main 
takeaways of this research are: (i) the results indicating that 
cross-company data can be useful to support DCA sessions, 
and (ii) the cross-company data supported DCA approach. 
Future work comprises further extending the approach 
and its cross-company model (for instance, with data from 
organizations of other countries and context factors), and 
conducting replications of the industrial case study with 
other industry partners. 
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